V

In the period following the Council of Trent there has not been an absence of discussion and controversy on subtle questions as to the power of the celebrating priest to apply the benefits of the sacrifice of the Mass, and the conditions of the exercise of any such power. On these matters it may suffice to quote a very few representative theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the assertions of the Council of Pistoia and the condemnation of those assertions by Pope Pius VI. at the end of the eighteenth century, and a modern divine.

1. Melchior Cano concluded that, so far as “satisfaction”—as distinct from “impetration”—is concerned, a greater benefit might be bestowed through the offering of the sacrifice for one person individually than if it were offered for him as one among many.

“They who do not offer do not receive an equal part if the offering is made for many and if it is made for one only. So that, if a priest of his own accord without any request from any friend should sacrifice for those who are absent, I say that it does not avail as much to the many as it would avail to one, if it was offered for one of them individually. I speak as regards satisfaction; for as regards impetration there is no less force in the sacrifice which is offered for many than in that which is offered for one alone. And this is common to all prayers, which suffer no loss as to impetration because they are made on behalf of many. But the helpers and hearers of Masses, those also who support the priest or in any way promote the sacrifice, really offer the sacrifice, and therefore each one receives a share of that offering in proportion to his devotion. Certainly the more closely the cause aiding the sacrifice is joined to the principal cause of it, the more it satisfies for penalty, so that a priest more than a deacon, a deacon more than a sub-deacon, a sub-deacon more than an acolyte, an acolyte more than one of the congregation; but he who has given to the priest the necessary payment for his sustenance excels each of these. And these also will satisfy the more, the more devoutly and religiously they perform, each their own duty.… We see in the first cause of natural things that, although it is itself of infinite power, yet by means of second causes it produces finite effects so great and of such a kind as the power and nature of the assisting causes require. And the priest does not impose limits on the sacrifice from his merit and holiness, but from his intention and application, whereby he applies the power of the sacrifice to this one or that, for whom he offers. As by means of the intention of the minister the blood of Christ is applied to little children who are baptised, and a fixed degree of grace is conferred, the degree which is not assigned by the holiness of the minister but by the will of Christ (for what degree it is, is unknown to mortals), so to those for whom the sacrifice is offered, if they do not themselves at the same time offer it, a fixed degree of penalty is remitted, a degree of which we are ignorant, which Christ has appointed by His will. But, as adults receive the more grace from Baptism, the more religiously and devoutly they receive it, so from the sacrifice he will receive the greater advantage who shall offer it with greater holiness and fervour. To little children the washing by a particular minister defines the power of the cross according to a fixed degree of grace, which we believe to be equal in them all, because in them all the disposition is equal; but on adults, since in them there is not the same disposition, but it differs in each individual, there is not the same degree of grace conferred, but it differs in different cases. So the offering of the individual priest determines the universal and infinite power of the sacrifice either to a fixed and equal remission of penalty in those who are related to the sacrifice in the same way, or also to an unequal remission in those who, since they are assisting causes of the sacrifice, are affected in different ways, that is, well, better, best.”

Vasquez expresses the opinion that the sacrifice is of as much benefit to individuals if it is applied to a greater number as if it is applied to fewer, for the reasons that

“a spiritual good, which belongs to the communication of itself, is like a spirit in relation to place, so that, as a spirit is whole in a whole place and whole in any part of a place, so also a spiritual good, such as is the fruit of the Mass, is entirely communicated whole to many and whole to individuals. Secondly, it is customary to explain and confirm this by the example of a bodily thing, because the same light of a lantern, when it is applied to many things on which it sheds light, does not give less light to each of them than it would if it were applied to fewer or to one only; and the same sound, when it is extended to many and is heard by them, affects the hearing of the individuals in the same way as if it were extended to a smaller number or to one only. Again, there is a proof from reason, because … by means of this Sacrament is applied to us the power of the merits of Christ, which, in that it is applied to many, does not benefit individuals less than if it were applied to fewer; therefore this sacrifice, by which it is applied, in the same way will benefit individuals, when it is offered for many, as if it were offered for fewer.”

Suarez holds a different view from Vasquez, and maintains that a greater benefit is bestowed by means of a more individual offering of the sacrifice.

“I say, first, when many assemble together with the priest for an identical sacrifice, all and each, insofar as they are offerers, receive the whole fruit, not less than if one only were offering; whence in this sense the fruit of this sacrifice can in a kind of way be called infinite, or rather infinitely increasable so far as extension is concerned.… I say, secondly, the effect of the sacrifice answering to the offering of the priest, namely, that which he can offer on behalf of others, is finite and one only. Wherefore, if it be offered for many—whether with different special intentions or with one common intention only, as for the people or the community—the fruit will be lessened in individuals, and so much the more as they are more in number, supposing the application is uniform.… I say, thirdly, this sacrifice of itself has infinite worth for impetrating; and therefore, on its part, when it is offered on behalf of many, it does not benefit individuals less, so far as impetration is concerned, than if it were offered for one only, although it could happen differently so as not to benefit individuals equally.”

De Lugo follows Suarez on this point, and in the course of his discussion bases an argument on the inferences which may be drawn from the practice of the Church. After mentioning Vasquez’s view, he says:—

“The more common and truer opinion denies simply this infinity in the sacrifice of the Mass.… It is proved, because otherwise it would follow that the sacrifice is applied in vain or almost in vain for some one departed person in particular; for, if it is of so great benefit to all and each as if it were applied for one only, why are not all Masses applied for all the departed, nay, also for all the living and for all other needs? Again, it would follow that the priest who is under an obligation to say Mass for two or for three could fulfil his obligation by offering one Mass for all, since it would be of as much benefit to them as if it were offered for each of them individually.”

2. The Council of Pistoia was held in September, 1786, being summoned by Scipio de Ricci, the Bishop of Pistoia, largely through the influence of Leopold, the Grand-Duke of Parma.… The general attitude of this council was in the direction of Jansenism and Gallicanism, and of some reforms in practice, such as the use of the vernacular in public worship. In the course of statements in regard to the Eucharistic sacrifice, some share in the sacrifice was allowed to those who might be present at Mass without communicating sacramentally on the ground of their Spiritual Communion, and the belief that the celebrating priest can apply the fruits of the sacrifice was condemned.

“Since the participation in the offering (vittima) is an essential part of the sacrifice, the holy synod would desire that the faithful should communicate every time that they are present. It does not condemn as unlawful those Masses in which those who are present do not communicate sacramentally, inasmuch as by receiving spiritually they participate, though in a less way, in the offering (vittima).”

“We believe that the offering is universal, yet so that there may be made in the liturgy a special commemoration of certain persons both living and departed by praying to God especially for them, yet not that we believe that it is in the power of the priest to apply the fruits of the sacrifice to whom he will; rather, we condemn this error as greatly offending against the laws of God, who alone distributes the fruits of the sacrifice to whom He will, and in what measure pleases Him.”

Eighty-five propositions of the Council of Pistoia were condemned by Pope Pius VI. in the Bull Auctorem fidei, dated 28th August, 1794. Among these, the two statements quoted above were condemned. The former of them—that relating to “the participation in the offering” as “an essential part of the sacrifice”—was described as “false, erroneous, suspected of heresy, and smacking of it,”

“insofar as it implies that any thing is lacking to the essence of the sacrifice in that sacrifice which is performed either with no one present or with those present who do not partake of the offering (victima) either sacramentally or spiritually, and as if those Masses are to be condemned as unlawful in which, while the priest alone communicates, there is no one present who communicates either sacramentally or spiritually.”

The latter of the two statements quoted above—that rejecting “the power of the priest to apply the fruits of the sacrifice to whom he will”—was described as “false, rash, destructive, hurtful to the Church, leading to error elsewhere condemned in the case of Wyclif,”

“being so understood that, besides the peculiar commemoration and prayer, the special offering or application of the sacrifice which is made by the priest is of no more benefit, other things being equal, to those on whose behalf it is applied than to others, as if no special fruit resulted from the special application, which the Church advises and orders to be made on behalf of fixed persons or orders of persons, particularly by pastors for their flocks.”

3. A statement by Dr. van Noort may be quoted as representative of an attitude ordinarily taken by Roman Catholic divines at the present time on the subject of the application of the benefits of the sacrifice of the Mass.

“First, every Mass is offered, not only in the person of the whole Church, but also on behalf of the whole Church; therefore there is some fruit which pertains to the whole Church, that is, to each of its members, and indeed, as certainly seems to be the case, according to the measure both of disposition and of the hierarchical place which they severally fill in the Church, the general or universal fruit. Nay, since all men pertain to the Church at least potentially and as it were being owed, this fruit can in a sort of way benefit them all indirectly; whence also we pray at the oblation of the chalice that the sacrifice ‘may ascend with the odour of sweetness on behalf of our salvation and of that of the whole world’. Secondly, every Mass is offered in the person of Christ and of the Church by the priest as a public minister, whence it is easily understood that to this ministry as such there corresponds a peculiar part of the fruits the personal or special fruit. And the fruit of this kind, the proportion being preserved, pertains also to the faithful who share in the act of offering. Nor are you to think that this personal fruit of the celebrant and of those who offer with him is the same as that fruit which we have explained above.… For the fruit both general and personal no peculiar intention is required on the part of the priest, for they follow the very nature of the sacrifice, as it was instituted by Christ. Since then they are as it were applied by Christ the Institutor, they cannot be transferred to others. Moreover, it is certain that these fruits are not lessened to individuals because many persons receive them at the same time, for they are received by individuals as in some way offering them. Thirdly, we have it from the tradition of the Church that the sacrifice of the Mass can be specially offered on behalf of fixed persons, or to obtain a fixed end. It is clear, therefore, that, besides the general and personal fruit, there is given a certain intermediate fruit, which depends on the free disposition and application of the priest, the middle or intentional fruit, which is also called special, that is, which pertains to those on whose behalf the priest specially applies the Mass by his own intention. Concerning this fruit there is a difference of opinion whether it is finite in extension or not, that is, whether it is so limited that it is lessened for individuals if the Mass is applied on behalf of many persons at the same time. Since the matter depends on positive institution, the question cannot be solved by internal reasons alone. And yet the traditional practice of the Church so favours the limitation of the intentional fruit that the contrary opinion does not seem very probable. Certainly it is the custom of the Church that Mass should be offered, nay, should be offered most often, for one or a few persons only. Now, if the middle fruit were unlimited in extension, a practice of this kind would be very hurtful, since others without any reason would be excluded from participation in the fruit of it. Many theologians restrict this limitation to the propitiatory effect alone, understanding, if I am not mistaken, the appeasing of the divine wrath and the remission of the penalty of time only; but their reasons are not of very great force; wherefore we are of opinion that each effect, both propitiatory and impetratory, is limited in extension.”